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ABSTRACT: Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in relativism. Proponents 
have defended various accounts that seek to model the truth-conditions of certain 
propositions along the lines of standard possible world semantics. The central challenge for 
such views has been to explain what advantage they have over contextualist theories with 
regard to the possibility of disagreement. I will press this worry against Max Kölbel’s 
account of faultless disagreement. My case will proceed along two distinct but connected 
lines. First, I will argue that the sense of faultlessness made possible by his relativism 
conflicts with our intuitive understanding of disagreement. And second, that his meta-
epistemological commitments are at odds with the socio-epistemic function of 
disagreement. This latter problem for relativistic accounts of truth has thus far been largely 
ignored in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a revival of interest in relativism. Proponents have 
defended various semantic accounts that seek to model the truth-conditions of 
certain propositions along the lines of standard possible world semantics. Taste 
predicates, knowledge ascriptions, epistemic modals, and future contingents have all 
been given relativistic treatments.1 However, the central challenge for such views 
has been to explain what advantage they have over contextualist theories with 
regard to the possibility of disagreement.  
My aims in this paper are fairly modest. I will press the worry about 
disagreement against the work of Max Kölbel, who offers an account of truth 
relativism as an explanation of ‘faultless disagreement.’ For ease of exposition, I will 
confine my discussion to claims of what is tasty, though the arguments here 
presented are readily generalizable to other domains. My case against Kölbel will 
                                                        
1 For example, see Max Kölbel, “The Evidence for Relativism,” Synthese 166 (2009): 375-395, John 
MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014).  
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proceed along two distinct but connected lines. First, I will argue that the sense of 
faultlessness made possible by his relativism conflicts with our intuitive 
understanding of disagreement. And second, that his meta-epistemological 
commitments are at odds with the socio-epistemic function of disagreement. This 
latter problem for relativistic accounts of truth has thus far been largely ignored in 
the literature. We will consider these matters in turn.  
2. Varieties of Disagreement and Objectivity  
There are several distinct senses in which speakers may disagree, and it is important 
to start by clarifying which are relevant for our purposes. According to what we may 
label ‘attitudinal disagreement,’ A and B disagree by adopting incompatible non-
doxastic attitudes towards some object or state of affairs. Examples include cases in 
which one person hopes for, fears, admires, or prefers something that another does 
not. Although interesting, these are not the sorts of disagreements with which we 
are here concerned.2  
I will limit discussion to doxastic disagreements, which are cases in which A 
and B hold incompatible beliefs. Simple cases will involve A believing p and B 
believing not-p. Strictly speaking, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for doxastic 
disagreement that the content of A’s belief contradicts that of B’s.3 However, since 
Kölbel frames his account of faultless disagreement in terms of contradictory 
content, I will ignore such additional qualifications.  
Following Cappelen and Hawthorne, we will also distinguish a state from an 
activity sense of disagreement. State disagreement arises between individuals 
holding inconsistent beliefs toward p, even if they are unaware of this fact or even 
of each other’s existence. For example, Plato and I may be in disagreement over his 
view of government in spite of the fact that there can be no interaction between us. 
Activity disagreement, on the other hand, “is the endpoint of a debate, argument, 
discussion, or negotiation.”4 Unlike state disagreement, it is necessary for activity 
disagreement that A and B are capable of interacting with each other in some way. 
                                                        
2 For additional discussion of attitudinal disagreement, see Torfinn Huvenes, “Disagreement 
without Error,” Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 143-154.  
3 See Teresa Marques, “Doxastic Disagreement,” Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 121-142 for a helpful 
discussion of this point.  
4 Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne, Relativism and Monadic Truth (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 60.  
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We can naturally express state disagreement by saying that A and B are ‘in’ 
disagreement, and activity disagreement by saying they are ‘having’ a disagreement.5  
Although distinct from each other, the recognition that one is in a state of 
disagreement may naturally precipitate having a disagreement. The fact that A and 
B hold inconsistent beliefs will sometimes lead them to engage in an argumentative 
process in which they exchange reasons with the intention of persuading each other. 
I will return to the epistemic function of activity disagreement in Sect. 5, but for 
now we will focus on state disagreement.  
Kölbel seeks to preserve the intuition that two people can disagree over 
whether, e.g.  
(L) ‘Licorice is tasty.’  
while simultaneously recognizing that neither’s belief is false. He offers the 
following account: 
A faultless disagreement is a situation where there is a thinker A, a thinker B, and 
a proposition (content of judgment) p, such that: 
(a) A believes (judges) that p and B believes (judges) that not-p and  
(b) Neither A nor B has made a mistake (is at fault).6  
The first condition specifies what it means for two people to disagree. It is 
necessary for disagreement that the same proposition asserted or believed by one 
person is the negation of that asserted or believed by the other.7 The second 
condition specifies the relevant sense of faultlessness. On Kölbel’s view, faultlessness 
requires that neither person has made the mistake of believing something false.8 
Truth thus plays its traditional role as a normative constraint on our beliefs.  
If cases of faultless disagreement are possible, they do not arise in objective 
domains of discourse. For example, if I disagree with my wife over the amount of 
money in our bank account, presumably at most one of us can be right. Rightness is 
here a ‘zero-sum’ affair in the sense that if one of us is right, then the other must be 
wrong. Disagreement in objective domains signals that someone has a false belief.  
                                                        
5 I will maintain this usage in what follows.  
6 Max Kölbel, “Faultless Disagreement,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2003): 53-54.  
7 For simplicity, I will assume that speakers sincerely assert those contents that they believe to be 
true, and will therefore treat things like belief, assertion, and judgement interchangeably.  
8 For an alternative account of faultless disagreement that relativizes justification rather than truth, 
see Duncan Pritchard, “Defusing Epistemic Relativism,” Synthese 166 (2009): 397-412. 
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But these sorts of cases contrast with those that Kölbel labels ‘non-objective.’ 
Claims regarding what is tasty in particular seem to depend not only on the 
properties of the items in question, but also on certain responses and features of 
experiencing subjects. With regard to a claim like (L), we may not be so quick to 
accept the idea that one person’s being right implies that anyone holding a 
contradictory belief is wrong. Kölbel thus takes the question of whether A and B can 
faultlessly disagree as a defining feature of his account of objectivity.  
One initial worry is that Kölbel has defined objectivity in such a way that he 
is able to get faultless disagreement too easily. Arguably, he has simply built the 
notion of faultless disagreement into his account of what it means for some content 
to be non-objective. It should then come as no surprise that if we accept his account 
of objectivity, we are also committed to faultless disagreement. Since non-objective 
domains are those in which disagreement does not indicate the presence of anyone’s 
error, his characterization of objectivity presupposes faultless disagreement rather 
than offers independent support for it. But the existence of faultless disagreement 
requires argumentation, and not a definition of objectivity that entails it.  
Were Kölbel to pick a more traditional conception of objectivity, his route to 
faultless disagreement would be less direct. For example, Rescher has offered a view 
of objectivity that is characterized by impartiality, freedom from personal biases and 
predilections, and universality.9 There is no direct step from this view of objectivity 
to the existence of faultless disagreement. But without reason to reject a more 
traditional view, Kölbel’s own view of objectivity appears objectionably ad hoc.  
3. Contextualism versus Relativism  
We will waive the above worry regarding Kölbel’s account of objectivity, and 
provisionally grant for the sake of argument that faultless disagreement in subjective 
domains is sometimes possible. The question then arises as to how we are to account 
for such disagreements.  
One semantic theory rejected by relativists like Kölbel is contextualism. 
Contextualists treat claims containing taste predicates along the lines of Kaplan’s 
treatment of indexicals.10 In Kaplan’s two-dimensional framework, which content, 
i.e. proposition, is expressed by sentences containing indexical components varies 
                                                        
9 Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1997). 
10 David Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” in Themes from Kaplan, eds. Joseph Almog, John Perry, and 
Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 481-563.  
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with features of the context of use. For example, which proposition is expressed by 
an assertion of ‘I have a headache’ depends on a speaker and a time of utterance.  
On a contextualist treatment of taste predicates, such claims make subtle 
indexical references to the speaker or to the speaker’s standards. This means that A’s 
assertion of (L) really expresses something to the effect of, ‘According to my standard 
of taste, licorice is tasty.’ The actual content expressed by our assertions that 
something is tasty therefore diverges from our surface grammar.  
The standard objection to contextualism – which Kölbel endorses – is that it 
fails to preserve an intuitive sense of disagreement. In a straightforward use of 
indexicals, A’s assertion that ‘I have a headache’ is compatible with B’s assertion that 
‘I do not have a headache.’ Since each speaker takes herself as the intended referent 
of ‘I,’ the contents of their assertions are distinct and may both be true. This 
possibility of mutual rightness undermines an intuitive sense of disagreement. And 
the same considerations apply mutatis mutandis to claims like (L). While A’s 
assertion of (L) appears to be the semantic negation of B’s assertion of not-(L), in fact 
both assertions may be true due to the posited shift in content.  
Kölbel presents this argument against contextualism as well, noting that it fails 
to preserve “the sense in which we intuitively think that we contradict one 
another.”11 The specific sense he has in mind is classical: “I am here interested in a 
semantic notion of contradiction: roughly, contradictory contents cannot both be 
true at once.”12 Since contextualism makes it possible for both of their beliefs to be 
true, A and B simply talk past each other. But the possibility of such mutual rightness 
prevents them from genuinely disagreeing with each other.  
Kölbel’s solution is to relativize the truth, rather than the content, to an 
individual’s standard of taste. An assertion of (L) will express the same content for 
all speakers in all contexts. However, its truth will vary with different standards. In 
Kaplan’s semantics, the truth-value of a contingent proposition expressed by a 
sentence is determined by a circumstance of evaluation, taken as an ordered pair w, 
t, where w is a possible world and t is a time. Kölbel proposes an analogous 
treatment, in which we replace t in the circumstance of evaluation with some 
standard of taste s. And just as we can shift from one world or time to another, Kölbel 
introduces the “FOR” operator, which has the function of shifting from one person’s 
                                                        
11 Max Kölbel, “Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 12, 3 (2004): 305. 
12 Max Kölbel, “Agreement and Communication,” Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 104.  
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standard of taste to another’s within the same world.13 Use of this operator in English 
is supported by our use of sentences like ‘For Mae, licorice is delicious.’ – formally, 
⌜FOR s, p⌝. The distinctly semantic nature of Kölbel’s relativism is now apparent. 
He states that  
The relativist has in mind a variation in truth value that goes beyond relativity to 
possible worlds. The relativist claims that even once we hold the possible world 
fixed, the value of the proposition …still varies with a standard of evaluation. We 
might call this the “standard of taste parameter” in the circumstances of 
evaluation…The relativist proposal is a natural extension of Kaplan’s semantic 
framework.14  
Relativism is then supposed to explain the existence of faultless disagreement 
in the following way. Both A and B are subject to the normative requirement that 
they ought not to believe or assert what is false relative to their own standard. 
Faultlessness consists in adherence to this relativized truth norm. And since the 
content of their beliefs and assertions is invariant, it is now possible for A and B to 
contradict each other in the way necessary for disagreement. I will challenge this 
proposal in the next section, but first I want to say something about Kölbel’s reliance 
on standard semantics.  
Kölbel’s claim that his relativistic semantics is a natural and modest extension 
of Kaplan’s framework is controversial.15 Although Kaplan’s framework leaves open 
the possibility of adding features beyond worlds to the circumstance of evaluation, 
there is a determinate answer to the question of which circumstance is privileged 
for the assessment of a contingent claim: that of the context of use.16 Kölbel’s 
framework, on the other hand, offers no uniquely privileged standard of taste 
relative to which the truth of claims like (L) can be assessed.17 (L)’s truth can thus be 
variously assessed relative to a potentially infinite number of standards, including 
those of A, B, C, or D. However, standards themselves cannot be objectively or 
neutrally compared to each other. Indeed, privileging certain standards over others 
                                                        
13 Such an operator requires us to countenance contents that are taste neutral, but we will not 
consider their plausibility here.  
14 Max Kölbel, “The Evidence for Relativism,” Synthese 166 (2009): 383.  
15 For a fuller critique of the relativist’s attempt to pattern their view on standard semantics, see 
Michael Glanzberg, “Semantics and Truth Relative to a World,” Synthese 166 (2009): 281-307. 
16 What Kaplan calls “the circumstance of the context.” See Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” 522.  
17 In Kölbel’s words, “None of these ways of evaluating the utterance seems to be clearly privileged, 
in the way the actual world is privileged in the evaluation of contingent utterances.” Kölbel, “The 
Evidence for Relativism,” 287.  
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“goes against the basic commitments of the relativist.”18 It is this inability to evaluate 
our standards that, I will argue, poses fundamental problems for disagreement.  
4. Against the Possibility of Faultless Disagreement 
We will start by considering whether Kölbel’s framework can account for a state 
sense of disagreement. Before presenting my own response to Kölbel, I want to 
consider a few existing objections. Rosenkranz presents the following dilemma for 
Kölbel’s account of faultless disagreement: 
Either A and B are said to merely present P and ~P, respectively, as being true 
relative to their own perspective, in which case the relative truth of P and ~P 
ensures that their assertions are correct but there is no longer any genuine 
disagreement between them. Or else, they are said to present these propositions as 
being true simpliciter (true absolutely, true relative to all perspectives), in which 
case they do indeed disagree but relativism fails to show that their disagreement is 
faultless.19  
For obvious reasons, the relativist will reject as question-begging an account 
whereby the very act of asserting a claim requires a commitment to its absolute 
truth.20 But neither will she accept Rosenkranz’s claim that “in asserting P, A 
presents P as being true relative to A’s perspective.”21 The substance of his objection 
is essentially that the relativist’s semantics collapses into contextualism. But as we 
have seen, Kölbel is clear to distinguish his view from contextualism. For Kölbel, 
while standards play a truth-determinative role with regard to our assertions and 
beliefs, reference to them does not form part of the content of what is asserted. 
While the relativist does bear the explanatory burden of clarifying her aims in 
making assertions, Kölbel can borrow the following response from MacFarlane: 
The relativist need not, and should not, hold that to put p forward as true for oneself 
is to put forward the claim that p is true for oneself. The point of “for oneself” is 
not to characterize the content that is asserted, but to characterize what the 
                                                        
18 Max Kölbel, “Global Relativism and Self-Refutation,” in A Companion to Relativism, ed. Steven 
Hales (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 23.  
19 Sven Rosenkranz, “Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement,” in Relative Truth, eds. 
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Max Kölbel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 231.  
20 This sort of objection to relativism is familiar from John Mackie, “Self-Refutation – A Formal 
Analysis,” The Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1964): 193-203, and Miles Burnyeat, “Protagoras and 
Self-Refutation in Plato’s Theaetetus,” The Philosophical Review 85 (1976): 172-195. 
21 Rosenkranz, “Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement,” 228.  
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relativist is doing in making her assertion: putting its content forward as true for 
herself [italics in original].22  
I therefore do not think that Rosenkranz’s objection is ultimately successful. 
Boghossian offers a different objection, one that challenges the idea that the 
disagreement can be faultless.  
The Argument from (Perspectival) Immersion: 
(1) The content (p) is at best relatively true. (Alethic Relativism) 
(2) If D judges validly that p, it will also be valid for D to judge that It’s true that 
p. (Truth is Disquotational within a perspective) 
(3) If D judges that It’s true that p then D must, on pain of incoherence, judge 
that It’s false that not-p.  
(4) If D judges that It’s false that not-p, then D must, on pain of incoherence, 
judge that anyone who judges not-p (e.g., N) is making a mistake. 
(5) Therefore, D must judge that N is making a mistake and so cannot regard the 
disagreement with N as faultless. 
(6) Therefore, the disagreement between D and N is not faultless.23  
The problem with Boghossian’s argument is that it saddles the relativist with 
an absolutist account of faultlessness. Recall that for Kölbel, faultlessness consists in 
not violating any norm to which one is subject, meaning that D and N have not 
judged anything false relative to their own perspective. If D faultlessly judges that 
It’s false that not-p, then he will have correctly judged relative to his perspective 
that not-p is false.24 However, this does not entail that D must judge that N (who 
judges that not-p is true) has made a mistake simpliciter, since relative to N’s 
perspective her contradictory judgment may also be faultless.  
For Kölbel, judgments of faultlessness, like truth, depend on the standards in 
question. Relative to D’s standards, N’s judgment is false, and vice versa. But relative 
to the standards for each that matter, i.e. their own, neither has made a mistake. 
Boghossian’s argument seems to ignore this fact, leaving room for the relativist to 
respond that D’s judgement that N has made a mistake simpliciter illegitimately 
treats her judgement as subject to his standards, rather than to her own.  
                                                        
22 MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity, 33.  
23 Paul Boghossian, “Three Kinds of Relativism,” in A Companion to Relativism, ed. Steven Hales 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 62.  
24 We must remember that relativizing clauses will not form part of the content of a thinker’s 
judgement. As discussed above, this reading of the relativist’s semantics would slide back into 
contextualism.  
Relativism, Faultlessness, and the Epistemology of Disagreement 
145 
In fairness to Boghossian, there is something odd about the relativist’s sense 
of faultlessness, a point to which I will return in the next section. But here I want to 
challenge the idea that thinkers can genuinely disagree over claims like (L), all the 
while taking seriously Kölbel’s view that their truth (rather than content) varies 
with standards. Consider the following argument, which I will refer to as  
The Argument against Genuine Disagreement:  
(7) If A and B are in genuine disagreement regarding p, then A and B contradict each 
other—A believes p while B believes not-p. (assumption)  
(8) If A and B contradict each other, then it cannot be the case that A’s belief that p 
and B’s belief that not-p are simultaneously true. (assumption)  
(9) If A and B are in genuine disagreement regarding p, then it cannot be the case 
that A’s belief that p and B’s belief that not-p are simultaneously true. (by 7 and 
8)  
(10) Suppose that truth is relativized to standards. (assumption) 
(11) If truth is relativized to standards, then it can be the case that A’s belief that p and 
B’s belief that not-p are simultaneously true—A and B are faultless. (assumption) 
(12) It can be the case that A’s belief that p and B’s belief that not-p are simultaneously 
true. (by 10 and 11) 
(13) It’s not the case that A and B contradict each other. (by 8 and 12) 
(14) It’s not the case that A and B are in genuine disagreement regarding p. (by 7 and 
13) 
(15) Therefore, it’s not the case that A and B are in faultless disagreement regarding p. 
(a fortiori, from 14).  
This argument, if successful, would show that faultless disagreement is 
impossible regardless of distinctions we might draw between objective and 
subjective domains of discourse. Since it is valid, we must examine the premises in 
light of Kölbel’s commitments.  
The key premises are (7), (8), (10), and (11). According to (7), contradiction is 
a necessary condition of disagreement. Kölbel could reject this premise, but this 
move would conflict with his earlier acceptance of it in his definition of faultless 
disagreement – see his condition (a). Further, recall that it was the fact that 
contextualism prevented the parties to the dispute from contradicting each other 
that motivated his rejection of this view. To drop contradiction as a necessary 
condition of disagreement would therefore undermine his primary reason for 
rejecting contextualism.25 Additionally, Kölbel has explicitly defended (10) and (11).  
                                                        
25 To clarify, I am not committed to a view of disagreement in which parties hold contradictory 
beliefs. However, since Kölbel holds this view, he is committed to this premise.  
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The pivotal premise, and the one Kölbel must reject if he is to block the 
conclusion, is (8). However, Kölbel explicitly accepts this standard view of a 
contradiction.26 There is a puzzling tension at the heart of Kölbel’s account of 
faultless disagreement. Relativizing truth to parameters beyond possible worlds is 
supposed to allow A and B’s contradictory beliefs to be simultaneously true, and thus 
for their disagreement to be faultless. But the possibility of mutual correctness 
required for faultless disagreement lies in tension with the condition that p and not-
p contradict each other. The fact that possible worlds are free of contradictions is in 
the most general sense why we take them to be possible in the first place. It is 
definitional that if two propositions are contradictory, then they cannot be 
simultaneously true at any world w.27  
Kölbel tries to avoid formal inconsistency by emphasizing that p and not-p 
are true relative to different perspectives. But this qualification does not address the 
fundamental problem that his view entails the existence of contradictions within 
what he claims are standard possible worlds.  
Assume for the sake of argument that we can reconcile such contradictions 
with possible worlds. There is still the problem of accounting for genuine 
disagreement. To see this, consider a case in which A and B occupy different possible 
worlds. A correctly judges that the contingent proposition ‘Trump won the 2016 
Presidential election’ is true, while B correctly judges this same proposition to be 
false. Since their beliefs concern different worlds, A and B do not contradict each 
other and thus on Kölbel’s account they do not disagree.28 Intuitively, this seems to 
be the right result. The reason there does not seem to be any disagreement is that 
both propositions may be true relative to the worlds relevant to their evaluation.  
There are independent reasons to extend an account of disagreement beyond 
cases involving contradictions, but there are limits to how far we can extend such 
an account. At the very least, cases of genuine disagreement require that the claims 
in question are in some sense incompatible with each other.29 Ordinarily, once we 
recognize such incompatibility, the natural move is to abandon the “disagreement” 
                                                        
26 Recall his earlier quote that “contradictory contents cannot both be true at once.” Kölbel, 
“Agreement and Communication,” 104. 
27 Formally, w ⊧ A iff w ⊭ A.  
28 The distinction between what a proposition is about and what it concerns is due to John Perry, 
“Thought without Representation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60, (1986): 137-151. A 
claim is about what it explicitly refers to, and concerns those objects to which its truth is relative.   
29 For additional discussion, see Carl Baker, “The Role of Disagreement in Semantic Theory,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2014): 37-54.  
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as only apparent. The relativist may respond that although this holds in objective 
domains, things are otherwise in subjective domains such as taste.  
But this response seems ad hoc, since the requirement of incompatibility 
underwrites philosophical discussions of disagreement outside of semantics. For 
example, much has been written recently about how one should rationally respond 
to cases of recognized peer disagreement.30 These are cases in which one recognizes 
that someone else just as competent and epistemically well-situated with regard to 
the matter at hand nevertheless holds an incompatible belief. The best explanation 
of why such cases are thought to present epistemic challenges to one’s continued 
belief is surely that it cannot be the case that both your own and your peer’s belief 
are true. Given the fact that at most one of you can be right, the epistemic challenge 
consists in explaining what reason there is to think that it is one’s peer rather than 
oneself that is mistaken. 
If we carry the above considerations from worlds to taste standards, the right 
result in cases in which the content of A and B’s belief are compatible is that they 
are not in disagreement with each other. Since both propositions may be true 
relative to the standards which are relevant for the assessment of each’s belief, any 
apparent disagreement is only that, i.e. apparent. So, even if we grant Kölbel that 
possible world semantics presents us with a kind of relativism, the right conclusion 
is that there is no disagreement.  
So far I have presented challenges for the idea that Kölbel can account for 
doxastic state disagreement. We will now consider whether he can account for 
doxastic activity disagreement.  
5. The Socio-Epistemic Role of Disagreement 
In additional to wanting our semantic theories to harmonize with an intuitively 
plausible account of state disagreement, we should also consider how well they 
                                                        
30 For a sample of what has become a substantial body of literature, see Jennifer Lackey, “A 
Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Social Epistemology, eds. 
Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 145-
154, David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,” Philosophical Review 
116 (2007): 187-217, Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford 
Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 1, eds. John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 167-196, and Richard Feldman, “Epistemological Puzzles about 
Disagreement,” in Epistemological Futures, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 216-236.  
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comply with the epistemic norms governing our argumentative practices. These are 
interesting questions that lie at the intersection of our semantics and epistemology. 
But so far, the epistemic implications of relativism have not been given adequate 
treatment in the literature.31 The focus of this section is to consider how well the 
relativist can preserve the socio-epistemic role of disagreement.  
Disagreement may serve many different functions. But within the context of 
social epistemology, its primary role is to rationally guide the formation, revision, 
and evaluation of our beliefs. Through disagreement, we are able to collectively 
engage in the pursuit of knowledge by using each other as epistemic resources.32 The 
recognition that we are in doxastic disagreement with someone often motivates us 
to engage in an argumentative activity in which we exchange reasons with the goal 
of convincing each other to change our minds. The specific kinds of reasons of 
interest to us in these disagreements are those that provide epistemic justification 
for our beliefs. And as Vahid points out, 
However we think of epistemic justification, it is its intimate link with truth – in 
terms of our concern for believing what is true and not believing what is false – 
that is said to set it apart from other (purported) species of justification.33  
Disagreements conceived as a socio-epistemic activity thus involve the 
exchange of reasons relevant to a belief’s truth. As seen, relativists like Kölbel have 
not abandoned the normative requirement to believe what is true. Rather, they have 
sought to relativize it. Accordingly, individuals are rationally required to believe 
what is true relative to their own standard. To borrow a nice phrase from Rovane, 
thinkers with different standards are “normatively insulated” from each other, since 
what is true and justified for one carries no epistemic force for the other.34  
Consider the application of these norms to a concrete example in which A and 
B recognize their state disagreement over (L), and are then motivated to persuade 
each other that they have a false belief. Since they are having a disagreement over a 
                                                        
31 J. A. Carter has also noted this deficiency, and gone some way toward addressing it. In particular, 
see his “Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision,” Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 155-172.  
32 Alvin Goldman presents a very helpful discussion of the aims and norms governing our socio-
epistemic practices. See his “Argumentation and Social Epistemology,” The Journal of Philosophy 
91 (1994): 27-49.  
33 Hamid Vahid, “Rationalizing Beliefs: Epistemic vs. Pragmatic Reasons,” Synthese 176, (2010): 
449.  
34 Carol Rovane, “Relativism Requires Alternatives, not Disagreement or Relative Truth,” in A 
Companion to Relativism, ed. Steven Hales (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 37. 
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claim’s truth, they should proceed by exchanging epistemic reasons. A can try to 
show B that he has mistakenly assessed (L)’s truth relative to B’s own standard of 
taste (and vice versa), but we can stipulate that neither has committed this error. But 
A cannot legitimately offer reasons for B to change his mind based on the truth 
(falsity) of (L) relative to A’s standards. This is simply because B is not subject to the 
norm to believe what is true relative to A’s standards, but rather what is true relative 
to his own. His response to A’s challenge will therefore consist in showing that (L) 
is true (false) relative to his own standard.  
The upshot is that once A and B recognize these facts, continued attempts to 
change each other’s mind would be inappropriate, since success would mean getting 
the other to violate an epistemic norm to which they are subject. This much is 
straightforward. But it also makes the prospects of exchanging forceful epistemic 
reasons, and hence the possibility of engaging in a genuine disagreement, look rather 
dim. Since they are normatively shielded, they must recognize the fact that the 
continued exchange of reasons is futile. In a revealing moment of candor, 
MacFarlane admits this much: 
The challenger thinks (rightly) that he has absolutely compelling grounds for 
thinking that the assertion was not accurate. But the original asserter thinks (also 
rightly, from her point of view) that the challenger’s grounds do nothing to call in 
question the accuracy of the assertion. The asserter’s vindication will seem to the 
challenger not to show that the assertion was accurate, and the challenger will 
continue to press his claim. (Until the game gets boring.) Thus we have all the 
normative trappings of real disagreement, but without the possibility of resolution 
except by a relevant change in one or both parties’ contexts of assessment [my 
italics].35  
This is problem enough, but there is a deeper worry. Ordinarily, individuals 
who have reached the above impasse can proceed with the disagreement by shifting 
attention to their evaluative standards. For example, suppose that A and B are 
epistemic contextualists, and disagree over the justificatory status of the claim that 
A has hands. A’s belief that he does is justified relative to ordinary standards, but 
unjustified relative to B’s more demanding standards.  
If A and B are to continue disagreeing after recognizing these facts, they must 
shift their disagreement to the question of whose standards are relevant in the 
present context. Unless they share the presupposition that there is some fact of the 
matter about whose standards are relevant, there is no point in continuing to 
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disagree. They may not resolve the matter, but there is at least the necessary 
common ground that makes such higher-order disagreement possible.  
Unfortunately, this same move is not available for relativists like Kölbel. The 
reason is that he rejects the thought that our evaluative standards are themselves 
subject to rational evaluation. A’s standard of taste relative to which (L) is true is no 
better (or worse) than B’s relative to which (L) is false. And both thinkers can of 
course recognize this fact. Unlike the case in the preceding paragraph, here there 
will not even be a shared assumption that someone’s standards are uniquely relevant. 
Each standard is relevant for its possessor.  
We may now return to MacFarlane’s concluding remark that resolution of 
disagreement is impossible unless at least one person changes their standards. Given 
the fact that such standards are not subject to rational evaluation, it will not be 
possible for someone to change standards on the basis of rational disagreement and 
the exchange of epistemic reasons. They may of course do so for other reasons, but 
not for the sorts of reasons considered relevant to the epistemology of disagreement. 
Relativistic views like Kölbel’s thus represent a significant departure from the role 
of disagreement in other philosophical contexts.  
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that Kölbel’s relativistic framework faces significant challenges. In 
spite of his repeated attempts to account for disagreement, purported cases neither 
look nor function like disagreement in other philosophical contexts. Additionally, 
his account of truth fails to carry the usual normative weight that we attach to it. 
Kölbel offers us an outward form of truth while ultimately denying its epistemic 
power. 
